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Abstract
We examine di¤erences in altruism and laziness between public
sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model
predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with
a workers altruism, and increases or decreases with a workers lazi-
ness depending on his altruism. Using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study, we nd that public sector employees are signi-
cantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private
sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these pat-
terns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of
altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring
industries; and that the di¤erence in altruism is already present at the
start of peoples career, while the di¤erence in laziness is only present
for employees with su¢ ciently long work experience.
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1 Introduction
Public sector organizations often strive for multiple goals, most of them being
di¢ cult to describe in an objective and precise way (Dixit 2002). The mul-
titude and vagueness of public sector organizations goals are also reected
in the way performance of employees is assessed in the public sector. As
compared to employees in the private sector, performance assessment in the
public sector is relatively rare and, if it exists, often tied to weaker incen-
tives (Burgess and Metcalfe 1999). As a result, performance of employees in
the public sector relies much more on intrinsic motivations than on extrinsic
incentives. A key issue therefore is what types of intrinsic motivations are
prevalent among public sector employees?
A rich empirical literature in public administration and a recent theoret-
ical literature in economics have addressed this issue. A key nding from
the public administration literature is that more altruistic people are more
likely to end up in a public-sector job.1 The economics literature has studied
the interplay between employee compensation packages and self-selection of
people with di¤erent motivations to the public sector.2 A common nding
is that the public sector can promote self-selection of motivated or altruis-
tic employees by o¤ering low pay (Handy and Katz 1998, Delfgaauw and
Dur 2007). Further, several studies have shown that, even if performance
assessment in the public sector is perfectly feasible, it can be optimal to pro-
vide weak incentives to employees in the public sector so as to extract rents
(Besley and Ghatak 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur 2007, Francois 2007). Provid-
ing weak incentives may, however, also imply that the public sector becomes
an attractive employer for lazy people (Delfgaauw and Dur 2008).
This paper examines di¤erences in altruism and laziness between em-
ployees in the public sector and the private sector. We start our analysis
by developing a simple model of sorting to the public sector in an economy
1See among others Rainey (1982), Crewson (1997), Houston (2000 and 2006), Brewer
(2003), Lewis and Frank (2002), and Frank and Lewis (2004). Perry et al. (2010) provide
an overview of this literature.
2See among others Handy and Katz (1998), Francois (2000 and 2007), Besley and
Ghatak (2005), Prendergast (2007), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007 and 2008), Nyborg and
Brekke (2011), and Buurman and Dur (2012). Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide
an overview of this literature.
1
where workers di¤er in altruism and laziness. In line with the evidence cited
above, we assume that in a public sector job, extrinsic rewards for perfor-
mance are relatively low (because performance is more di¢ cult to measure)
while intrinsic rewards for performance are relatively high (because of the
opportunity to contribute to other peoples welfare in a public sector job).
Our theoretical analysis predicts that a workers likelihood of working in the
public sector increases with his altruism, and increases or decreases with his
laziness depending on his altruism. Altruism induces sorting to the public
sector because public sector jobs o¤er an opportunity to contribute to other
peoples welfare. Laziness has a more indirect e¤ect on sorting. As lazy peo-
ple nd it costly to work hard, their choice of sector is not so much driven
by sectoral di¤erences in rewards for performance, but more by sectoral dif-
ferences in other benets and costs that are unrelated to e¤ort. Hence, for
selsh workers, the likelihood of working in the public sector increases with
laziness, because more lazy workers more likely forego the high extrinsic re-
wards for performance in the private sector to enjoy public sector benets
that are unrelated to e¤ort (e.g. the base salary). The opposite holds for
highly altruistic workers who nd e¤ort more rewarding in the public sector
than in the private sector. These workers more likely forego the high intrin-
sic rewards for performance in the public sector in return for private sector
benets unrelated to e¤ort when they are more lazy. Hence, our theory pre-
dicts a negative interaction e¤ect between a workers altruism and laziness.
Depending on the exact parameter values, either workers who are altruistic
and energetic or workers who are altruistic and lazy are most likely to sort
to a public-sector job. Workers who are selsh and energetic are always least
likely to sort to the public sector.
We test our theoretical predictions using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a yearly panel that started
in 1984 and now covers over 11.000 German households. The rich set of
personality measures and demographic variables in the SOEP o¤ers a rare
opportunity to study sorting of altruistic and lazy workers to the public sec-
tor. Following Becker et al. (2012), our measure for altruism is the workers
response to the survey question: How important is it for you to "be there
for others"? This question was included in the 2004-wave. Our measure for
laziness comes from the 2005-wave and is given by the workers response to
the statement: "I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy." We exam-
ine how these self-reported personality characteristics are related to sector of
employment after controlling for a rich set of demographics.
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The results of our empirical analysis are as follows. In line with our predic-
tions, we nd that the likelihood of working in the public sector is positively
and signicantly related to a workers altruism. A one standard-deviation
increase in altruism results in a 1.3 percentage-points higher probability of
working in the public sector. We nd a similar result for a workers laziness,
both in size and statistical signicance. A one standard-deviation increase
in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage-points higher probability of working
in the public sector. In contrast to our predictions, we nd no evidence for
an interaction e¤ect between a workers altruism and laziness. The estimate
of the interaction e¤ect is insignicant and very close to zero. Our esti-
mates imply that workers who are both altruistic and lazy have the highest
likelihood of ending up in the public sector. The predicted probability of
a highly altruistic and highly lazy worker of working in the public sector is
33%. Workers who are selsh and highly energetic least likely work in the
public sector, with a predicted probability of 20%.
Next, we do a series of robustness checks. First, we check whether the
results are similar across education levels. In line with previous work for
other countries (Lewis and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2010), we nd
stronger e¤ects of altruism (and also of laziness) for better educated work-
ers, with point estimates that are twice as large as those for the full sample.
Next, following Gregg et al. (2011), we examine in how far our results are
driven by the overrepresentation of caring jobs in the public sector. Re-
stricting the sample to employees in caring industries, we nd that altruism
becomes twice as important for sorting to the public sector, while we nd no
change in the importance of laziness (though the e¤ect is no longer statis-
tically signicant). For employees in non-caring industries, we nd positive
and signicant sorting of lazy people to the public sector, but no sorting
of altruistic people. These results nicely complement those of Gregg et al.
(2011) for the UK, who exploit panel data on self-reported unpaid overtime
of employees in for-prot and not-for-prot caring and non-caring industries.
Lastly, we examine whether the sorting patterns that we nd are mainly
the result of self-selection at the beginning of peoples career, or whether the
sorting patterns become more pronounced for more experienced employees.
Work experience may a¤ect sorting patterns for two reasons. First, initial
years of peoples careers may be spent on job shopping,with many peo-
ple holding jobs that are not a good match with their tastes and abilities
(as in the models by Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979, and Neal 1999). As a
result, we would expect weaker sorting patterns for employees with shorter
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work experience. Second, employeespreferences may adapt to experience,
for instance as a result of organizational socialization (Brewer 2008). Such
preference adaption may result in stronger or weaker sorting patterns de-
pending on how entrantsattitudes di¤er from the prevailing organizational
culture. Previous empirical work has found a decline in altruistic motivations
with tenure among public sector employees (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975,
Moynihan and Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman et al.
2012). We do not nd a similar pattern in our data. Public sector employ-
ees are more altruistic as compared to their private sector counterparts at
the start of their career, and by and large it remains like this throughout
their career. However, we do nd a striking pattern for laziness, with small
di¤ererences between public and private sector early in peoples career, and
big di¤erences later on. To what extent these di¤erences are driven by early-
career job shopping or preference adaption is, unfortunately, hard to uncover
due to the cross-sectional nature of our data.
The SOEP data have been used previously to examine sorting of work-
ers to the public sector. Pfeifer (2011) focuses on risk attitude and nds
clear evidence that people who are more risk averse are more likely to sort
to the public sector. We include risk attitude as a control variable in our
regressions and nd a similar result. In addition to risk attitude, Dohmen
and Falk (2010) take up a number of broad measures of peoples preferences
and personality, such as (positive and negative) reciprocity, trust, and all
of the Big Fivepersonality indicators. Likewise, Luechinger et al. (2010)
include the self-assessed importance of having a successful careerand being
engaged in social and political activities. In contrast to these studies, our
empirical analysis is inspired by our theory conned to the role of more
narrowly dened facets of personality, namely altruism and laziness. While
the use of broad personality measures such as Big Five is quite common (see
e.g. the reviews by Almlund et al. 2011 and Becker et al. 2012), these mea-
sures have been criticized for being too blunt and for suppressing important
underlying facets of personality (Borghans et al. 2008: 1008-1009). Indeed,
several studies in psychology nd that underlying trait measures do a better
job in predicting and explaining behavior and outcomes than the Big Five
indicators (e.g. Paunonen and Ashton 2001 and Roberts et al. 2005). In
line with these ndings, we nd pretty strong sorting to the public sector
on the basis of the narrowly dened traits of altruism and laziness, whereas
Dohmen and Falk (2010) and Luechinger et al. (2010) nd much weaker and
often insignicant patterns using broader measures of social preferences and
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conscientiousness.
While the main aim of our study is to contribute to the body of knowledge
about the nature and origin of public sector workers motivations, we believe
that our ndings may also help policy makers to design better HR policies.
By learning about employeesintrinsic motivations, HR-specialists are better
able to ne-tune personnel policies in the public sector to the special needs
and wishes of the current workforce. Moreover, in the light of our ndings,
policy makers may wish to reconsider current personnel policies so as to
attract and retain a di¤erently motivated workforce in the future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
develop and analyse a simple model of sorting and derive our key hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and our empirical strategy. The results of the
empirical analysis are presented in Section 4. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
Building on Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), we develop a simple model of sorting
to the public sector. Workers in our model are heterogenous in two ways:
they di¤er in altruism, denoted by i 2 [0; ]  0, and in laziness, denoted by
i 2 [; ] > 0. Both characteristics are private information of the individual
and are drawn from a continuous distribution.3 As in Besley and Ghatak
(2005) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), altruism in our model is of the impure
form. That is, altruistic individuals care about their personal contribution to
other peoples welfare, not about other peoples welfare per se (see Andreoni
1990). Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2010) provide eld-experimental evidence
supporting this assumption.
Workers choose their sector of employment, either the private sector or the
public sector. The private sector is perfectly competitive such that workers
are paid the full marginal product, denoted by p, for each unit of e¤ort. For
convenience, we abstract from opportunities to contribute to other peoples
welfare in the private sector, and so a workers altruism  does not a¤ect his
utility when working in the private sector.4 A workers laziness  enters the
3This contrasts Delfgaauw and Dur (2008), who consider a three-type model (featuring
motivated, regular, and lazy workers).
4Allowing for such opportunities (e.g. making charitable donations, volunteering) would
not change our results as long as such contributions are not a perfect substitute for work
e¤ort in the public sector. For instance, a public sector job may simply make it more
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workers utility function through the cost of e¤ort, which is identical across
sectors. The utility from working in the private sector is given by:
Uprivate = pei   ie
2
i
2
;
implying that optimal e¤ort equals:
eprivatei =
p
i
:
By substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function, we obtain the indirect
utility from working in the private sector for a worker of type (i; i):
p2
2i
.
Thus, a workers indirect utility from working in the private sector increases
in the marginal product of e¤ort and decreases in a workers laziness.
In contrast to the private sector, a workers e¤ort in the public sector is
unobservable. Hence, workers cannot be paid for performance and, instead,
receive a base salary denoted by w.5 In addition, altruistic workers enjoy
a nonpecuniary benet equal to iei from making a contribution to public
sector output. Thus, workers utility from working in the public sector is
given by:
Upublic = w + iei  
ie
2
i
2
  "i;
implying an optimal level of e¤ort equal to:
epublici =
i
i
:
The stochastic term "i captures all nonpecuniary sector benets and costs
for worker i that are unrelated to his e¤ort. It is drawn from a distribution
with CDF F (") = Pr("i  "), PDF f(") > 0, and boundaries " 2 ["; "]
such that there is some variation in sector choice for each possible worker
type (; ). Substituting optimal e¤ort into the utility function gives the
indirect utility of working in the public sector for a worker of type (i; i):
w +
2i
2i
  "i. Hence, a workers indirect utility from working in the public
sector is increasing in his altruism and decreasing in his laziness.
easy or less costly to contribute to other peoples welfare. Huck and Rasul (2010) provide
convincing evidence for substantial transaction costs in making charitable donations.
5Complete absence of performance-related pay is, of course, an extreme assumption
and made for convenience only. All of our results hold as long as incentive pay is weaker
in the public sector than in the private sector.
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A worker joins the public sector when the utility from working in the
public sector is higher than or equal to the utility from working in the private
sector:
w +
2i
2i
  "i  p
2
2i
:
Hence, the fraction of workers of type (i; i) who choose to work in the
public sector is given by:
Pr("i  w + 
2
i   p2
2i
) = F (w +
2i   p2
2i
):
It immediately follows that the likelihood of choosing a job in the public
sector increases in altruism i:
@F ()
@i
=
i
i
f(w +
2i   p2
2i
) > 0:
The intuition is straightforward: Higher altruism implies that a job in the
public sector becomes intrinsically more rewarding and, hence, more attrac-
tive. The e¤ect of a workers laziness i on the likelihood of choosing a public
sector job is described by:
@F ()
@i
=
p2   2i
22i
f(w +
2i   p2
2i
):
Hence, for relatively selsh workers (those with i < p), the likelihood of
public sector employment increases with laziness, while the reverse holds
for highly altruistic workers (those with i > p). The intuition is as fol-
lows. Workers choose sector by comparing extrinsic and intrinsic rewards
for performance (p and i) and other individual-specic sector benets that
are unrelated to e¤ort or performance (the stochastic term "i and the base
salary). The latter benets are more important for sector choice of more
lazy workers. The reason is that lazy people nd it costly to work hard and
so they gain less utility when e¤ort becomes more rewarding (intrinsically
or extrinsically). Consequently, a selsh workers likelihood of working in
the public sector increases in his laziness, because a more lazy worker more
likely foregoes the extrinsic rewards for performance in the private sector to
enjoy the public sectors benets that are unrelated to e¤ort (). The oppo-
site holds for a highly altruistic worker. His likelihood of choosing the public
7
sector decreases with his laziness, as a more lazy worker more likely chooses
to forego the high intrinsic rewards for performance in the public sector to
enjoy private sectors benets that are unrelated to e¤ort (represented by "i).
Combined these comparative statics imply that workers who are selsh
and energetic are least likely to sort to the public sector. If the type space is
su¢ ciently rich (more precisely, if  > p), then workers who are altruistic and
energetic are most likely to work in the public sector, followed by workers
who are altruistic and lazy. This is illustrated in Figure 1.6 If the type
space is smaller such that  < p, then the e¤ect of laziness on the likelihood
of public sector employment is positive for all possible values of altruism.
Hence, in that case, workers who are altruistic and lazy are most likely to
sort to the public sector, see Figure 2.
3 Data and empirical strategy
We test our predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
study (SOEP), conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research
(DIW Berlin). The SOEP is an unbalanced panel, containing yearly survey
data. The rst wave was conducted in 1984. The survey includes questions on
employment, earnings, health, and in recent waves a rich set of personality
measures. The SOEP covers over 11.000 German households and 20.000
people living in these households.
Our key variables of interest are questions on stated altruism, laziness,
and sector of employment. We measure altruism by the response to the
question: "[How important] are the following things (Be there for others)
currently for you?" Respondents rated themselves on a four-point scale, rang-
ing from "not at all important" to "very important".7 Laziness is measured
by the response to the statement: "I see myself as someone who tends to be
lazy". The response is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from "does
not apply to me at all" to "applies to me perfectly". Lastly, respondents
indicated whether they are employed in the public sector by the question:
"Does the company in which you are employed belong to the public sector?"
6In creating Figure 1 (and Figure 2) the stochastic term " is assumed to follow a
continuous uniform distribution on the interval ["; "]. The gures look similar with other
distributions as long as second-order e¤ects through f 0() are not dominant.
7The same measure for altruism is used in Becker et al. (2012), who study the relation
between economic preferences and personality measures from psychology.
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A limitation of the dataset is that we cannot infer whether a worker who
does not work in the public sector is employed in a for-prot or not-for-prot
organization. If not-for-prot organizations o¤er similar types of jobs as the
public sector, our coe¢ cients of interest are biased towards zero.
We restrict our analysis to the 2005 wave, because previous waves do not
contain questions on a workers laziness. The data on a workers altruism
are taken from the 2004 wave. From the 2005 wave we select all workers
who indicate that they are working in either the public sector or the private
sector, resulting in a sample of 10.819 workers of whom 2.824 (26.1%) are
employed in the public sector and 7.995 (73.9%) are employed in the private
sector.
We use a Linear Probability Model to estimate the probability that a
worker with given altruism and laziness is employed in the public sector in-
stead of the private sector.8 We control for a number of demographics such
as gender, age, education, nationality, marital status, number of children,
and state of residence.9 Additionally, we control for workers risk prefer-
ences, as in Dohmen and Falk (2010), Luechinger et al. (2010), and Pfeifer
(2011). The measure for risk preferences is taken from the 2004 wave and
indicates a persons general aversion to risk as measured on an eleven-point
scale by the response to the question "How do you see yourself: Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks?". Dohmen et al. (2011) have validated this measure through
incentivized experiments.
Our regression specication is:
Pr (Sector = public) =  + A+ !L+ '(A L) + x0 + ";
where A represents our measure of altruism, L is our measure of laziness,
and the vector x contains all control variables. In line with our theoretical
model we expect a positive e¤ect of laziness (! + ' A > 0) for low values
of altruism and a negative e¤ect of laziness (! + ' A < 0) for high values
of altruism. This implies that the conditional e¤ect of laziness should be
8We use the Linear Probability Model for ease of interpretation. Our results are robust
to di¤erent model specications: Probit or Logit give similar results. Fewer than 1% of
all predicted outcomes using the Linear Probability Model fall outside the [0,1] interval.
9States included in the analysis are Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin (East),
Berlin (West), Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, North-Rhine-Westfalia, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
Schleswig-Holtstein, and Thuringa.
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positive, ! > 0, and the interaction e¤ect of altruism and laziness should be
negative, ' < 0. Next, we expect a positive e¤ect of altruism for all values
of laziness ( + ' L > 0); that is, we expect  > 0 to be su¢ ciently large
as compared to ' < 0.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. Public sector work-
ers score themselves slightly higher as compared to private sector workers on
altruism, laziness, and risk aversion. There are considerable di¤erences be-
tween public sector workers and private sector workers in socio-demographic
variables. Public sector workers are on average more likely to be female,
older, higher educated, a German citizen, married, and have less children
as compared to private sector workers. Table 2 shows correlations between
the independent variables. Laziness shows a small but signicant negative
correlation with both altruism and risk aversion. The correlation between
altruism and risk aversion is insignicant. Further, the table shows that our
personality characteristics correlate with gender and age, suggesting that it
is important to control for these demographics in the regression.
4 Results
Table 3 shows the estimation results of the linear probability model using
the full sample. The coe¢ cient estimates show the change in the decimal
probability of working in the public sector instead of the private sector given
a unit change in the independent variable. We report robust standard errors
to correct for heteroskedasticity resulting from the binary structure of our
response variable.
The rst column shows the estimation results without taking up any con-
trol variables as well as without allowing for a possible interaction e¤ect
between altruism and laziness. The estimation results show that the like-
lihood that a worker is employed in the public sector is increasing in his
altruism. This e¤ect is positive and signicant. A unit increase in altruism
increases the likelihood of working in the public sector instead of the private
sector by 3.3 percentage points. We nd a weaker result for laziness. A unit
increase in laziness has a positive but insignicant e¤ect (p = 0:117) of 0.5
percentage points on the likelihood of working in the public sector.10
10We have checked for non-linear e¤ects of altruism and laziness on the likelihood of
working in the public sector and found no signicant e¤ects.
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Next, we control for socio-demographics and risk preferences in column 2.
The e¤ect of a workers altruism is robust in both sign and signicance; the
magnitude of the e¤ect slightly decreases from 3.3 to 2.4 percentage points.
We now also nd a positive and highly signicant e¤ect of a workers laziness
on sector of employment. A unit increase in laziness results in a 0.9 per-
centage point increase in the likelihood of working in the public sector. The
increase in the magnitude of the coe¢ cient stems mainly from the inclusion
of age and gender as control variables. Older people and females on average
claim to be less lazy (see Table 2) as well as have a higher likelihood of work-
ing in the public sector (see Table 1). Omission of these control variables
gave rise to a downward bias in the coe¢ cient for laziness in column 1.
As discussed in the previous section, altruism is measured on a four-
point scale whereas laziness is measured on a seven-point scale. To make a
better comparison of e¤ect sizes between altruism and laziness, we compute
standardized coe¢ cients. We compare the e¤ect of a one standard deviation
change in the independent variable on the likelihood of working in the public
sector. We nd that the e¤ect sizes of altruism and laziness are similar in
magnitude. An increase by one standard deviation in altruism results in a 1.3
percentage point increase in the probability of working in the public sector. A
one standard deviation increase in laziness results in a 1.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of working in the public sector. These results
suggest that altruism and laziness are equally important in determining a
workers sector of employment.
Several of our control variables turn out to be important in explaining a
workers sector of employment. In line with the literature on risk preferences,
we nd that workers who are more risk averse are signicantly more likely to
work in the public sector instead of the private sector. A unit increase in risk
aversion results in a 0.5 percentage points higher likelihood of working in the
public sector. This corresponds to a standardized e¤ect size that is slightly
smaller than the standardized e¤ect sizes for altruism and laziness. Addition-
ally, we nd that public sector employees are more likely to be female, older,
better educated, and have fewer kids. The state dummies, which control for
unobserved heterogeneity between states, are jointly signicant (p < 0:01).
Column 3 of Table 3 adds the interaction of altruism and laziness. In
contrast to our theoretical predictions, we do not nd evidence for an inter-
action e¤ect between a workers altruism and laziness. The estimate of the
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coe¢ cient is insignicant and very close to zero.11 This implies that not the
highly altruistic and energetic workers have the highest likelihood of being
employed in the public sector, but those workers who are altruistic and lazy.
Our estimates imply that they face a probability of working in the public sec-
tor of 32.8%.12 Workers who are altruistic and energetic are signicantly less
likely to work in the public sector with an estimated probability of working
in the public sector of 27.1%. This probability does not di¤er signicantly
(p > 0:10) from the corresponding probability for workers who are selsh
and lazy, who face a predicted probability of working in the public sector of
25.7%. Workers who are selsh and energetic are least likely to sort to the
public sector, with an estimated probability of 20%.
Recent literature suggests that intrinsic motivation is a more important
determinant of sorting to the public sector for higher educated workers (Lewis
and Frank 2002, Dur and Zoutenbier 2010). We nd evidence in line with
these studies for altruism and laziness. Table 4 shows the regression results
for subsamples of each category of education.13 Neither a workers altruism
nor laziness has a signicant e¤ect on sector of employment for workers with
less than high school education. We do nd some evidence for sorting of
altruistic workers to the public sector among high-school graduates. We nd
the strongest results for workers in the highest education category. A unit
increase in altruism increases the likelihood of working in the public sector
for a highly educated worker by 3.9 percentage points, while a unit increase
in laziness increases the likelihood of working in the public sector for a highly
educated worker by 1.8 percentage points. A possible reason why altruism
matters more for the sorting of higher educated workers lies in the nature of
their job, with higher educated workers having more opportunities to make a
11One possible interpretation for the insiginicant coe¢ cient for the interaction term
together with the signicant coe¢ cient for altruism is that public sector employeescon-
tribution to society is (partly) independent of their e¤ort. For instance, public sector
employees may consider the wage gap between the private sector and the public sector as
a donation to society. This interpretation ts well with Perry and Wise (1990)s classic
typology of public service motivation that includes both the desire to serveas well as
the desire to participate, where the former depends on a workers e¤ort while the latter
does not. A recent economic model including both types of public service motivation is
Delfgaauw and Dur (2010).
12Predicted probabilities are calculated given the mean values of all control variables.
Signicance levels (p < 0:01) are calculated using delta method standard errors.
13As in the full sample, we do not nd signicant interaction e¤ects in the subsamples
and therefore report regressions estimates without interaction.
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signicant contribution to society in a public sector job. Laziness may matter
more for the sorting of higher educated workers because in Germany extrinsic
rewards for performance are generally rare among less educated workers and
more prevalent among better educated workers (see tables 3 and 4 in Dur
et al. 2010). We nd some further support for this interpretation from our
result that risk aversion only matters for sector of employment of the highly
educated workers. The signs and signicance of the other control variables
are fairly similar across all levels of education, aside from risk aversion.
Next, we examine heterogeneity in sorting to the public sector between
industries. Relatively many jobs in the public sector involve taking care for
people. Our estimates of sorting to the public sector may be confounded if
altruistic (and/or lazy) workers have a particular tendency to take a job in
the caring industry. Following Gregg et al. (2011), we have constructed two
subsamples: the caring industries and the non-caring industries.14 Table 5
reports the regression results for these subsamples. While the coe¢ cients for
laziness hardly di¤er between industries, there is a big di¤erence between
industries in sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector. As compared
to the full sample, the sorting of altruistic workers to the public sector is
much stronger in the caring industries and is virtually absent in the non-
caring industries. These results nicely t with those of Gregg et al. (2011)
for the UK.
Lastly, we explore whether the sorting patterns that we have found are
more or less pronounced for more experienced employees. As discussed in the
Introduction, sorting may be related to work experience for two important
reasons. First, at the start of peoples career, job shoppingmay be preva-
lent, with many people holding jobs that are not a good match with their
tastes and abilities (Johnson 1978, Jovanovic 1979, and Neal 1999). As a
result, we would expect weak sorting patterns for employees with short work
experience, as self-selection to good matches takes time. Second, employees
preferences may adapt to experience, for instance as a result of organizational
14The following 2 digit industry classications are labeled a caring industry: Education
and Sport, Health Service, Service Industries, Voluntary Church, and Private Household.
The remaining 2 digit industry classications are labeled a non-caring industry: Agricul-
ture and Forestry, Fisheries, Energy and Water, Mining, Chemicals, Synthetics, Earth,
Clay and Stone, Iron and Steel, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Wood,
Paper and Print, Clothing and Textile, Food Industry, Construction, Construction Re-
lated, Wholesale, Other Transport, Financial Institutions, Insurance, Restaurants, Trash
Removal, Other Services, and Public Administration.
13
socialization (Brewer 2008). Such preference adaption may result in stronger
or weaker sorting patterns depending on how entrantsattitudes di¤er from
the prevailing organizational culture. In Table 6, we show the results of re-
gressions that include an interaction of altruism and work experience, and of
laziness and work experience (measured in years).15 The rst column shows
that a unit increase in altruism for workers with no work experience, results
in a positive and signicant e¤ect of 2.7 percentage points on the likelihood
of working in the public sector. This suggests that altruistic workers already
at the start of their career self-select to the public sector. The interaction
e¤ect of altruism and work experience is negative, suggesting that the e¤ect
of altruism on the likelihood of working in the public sector is smaller for
workers with higher levels of work experience. This result is in line with a
number of previous studies (Blau 1960, Van Maanen 1975, Moynihan and
Pandey 2007, De Cooman et al. 2009, and Buurman et al. 2012). The
second column allows the e¤ect of altruism to depend nonlinearly on work
experience. These estimates imply that, even though the e¤ect of a workers
altruism declines with work experience in the rst few years of a workers ca-
reer, the e¤ect increases in the last years of a workers career, as illustrated in
Figure 3. Hence, overall, there is not a very clear relation between a workers
altruism and his work experience. Public sector employees are more altruistic
as compared to their private sector counterparts at the start of their career,
and by and large it remains like this throughout their career. For laziness, we
do nd a striking pattern. Column 1 shows that the e¤ect of a unit increase
in laziness for workers with low levels of work experience is insignicant and
very close to zero. However, the e¤ect of laziness is positive and signicant
for workers with higher levels of work experience. The second column adds
an interaction between a workers laziness and work experience squared. As
illustrated in Figure 4, these estimates imply that a workers laziness becomes
more important for sorting as work experience increases. Whether this stems
from preference adaption or delayed self-selection cannot be assessed due to
the cross-sectional nature of our data.16
Results from Table 7 provide some further evidence for self-selection.
Here we look at workers who started their career only after their altruism
and laziness had been measured. That is, we look at workers who started
15Unfortunately, we only have data on workers aggregate work experience, not on work
experience within a sector.
16To be sure, the SOEP is a panel, but the survey question on laziness was included
only recently.
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their career between 2005 and 2010.17 This certainly precludes any feedback
e¤ects from working in a particular sector on personality traits, but does
pose di¢ culties in obtaining a su¢ ciently large sample size. Table 7 shows
very similar results in sign and magnitude as compared to the estimates
for workers with low levels of work experience in Table 6. However, we do
not nd statistically signicant results, which could well be due to the very
limited sample size.
5 Concluding remarks
We have studied how intrinsic motivations of public sector employees com-
pare to those of private sector employees using a representative sample of
German workers. In line with our theoretical predictions, we have found
that public sector employees are signicantly more altruistic than private
sector employees. This di¤erence is already present at the start of peo-
ples career and is more pronounced among highly educated employees and
in caring industries. We have also found that public sector employees are
signicantly more lazy than private sector employees. This di¤erence only
shows up for more experienced employees, which could be due to early-career
job shoppingor to preference adaption. Lastly, we did not nd evidence
for our theoretical prediction of a negative interaction between altruism and
laziness in the sorting to the public sector, which may indicate that public
sector employeescontribution to society is (partly) independent of their ef-
fort. Together these results imply that workers who are both highly altruistic
and lazy have the highest likelihood of sorting to the public sector (with a
predicted probability of 33%), whereas selsh and highly energetic workers
have the lowest likelihood of sorting to the public sector (with a predicted
probability of 20%).
A natural next step would be to include wages in the empirical analy-
sis, as in the endogenous switching regression models by Van der Gaag and
Vijverberg (1988), Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993), and Dustmann and Van
Soest (1998). Our theory predicts that wages in the private sector decrease
in a workers laziness and are independent of his altruism, whereas public
sector wages are at. It would be interesting to learn how much of the di¤er-
17To be more precise, we restrict the sample to workers who in one of the years between
2005 and 2010 indicated for the rst time that they were employed and reported in that
same year tenure of less than or equal to one year.
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ences in personality characteristics between public sector and private sector
employees that we have found in this study can be attributed to di¤erences
in the wage returns to altruism and laziness between sectors. Such a study
does pose the challenge of nding variables that are credibly exogenous to
wage determination but not to selection (or the other way around).
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs. Public Private Total
Altruism 10819
Mean 3.21 3.16 3.18
Standard deviation (0.56) (0.57) (0.56)
Laziness 10819
Mean 2.24 2.19 2.20
Standard deviation (1.48) (1.47) (1.48)
Risk aversion 10574
Mean 5.33 5.13 5.18
Standard deviation (2.13) (2.25) (2.22)
Gender: % Female 10574
Mean 0.57 0.43 0.47
Standard deviation (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 10574
Mean 44.47 42.05 42.68
Standard deviation (10.80) (11.51) (11.38)
Education: % level 10574
Less than High School 0.07 0.12 0.11
High School 0.47 0.67 0.61
More than High School 0.46 0.21 0.28
Nationality: % German 10574
Mean 0.97 0.92 0.93
Standard deviation (0.18) (0.27) (0.25)
Relationship status: % type 10574
Single 0.21 0.26 0.25
Married 0.66 0.63 0.64
Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.02
Divorced 0.08 0.08 0.08
Separated 0.03 0.02 0.02
Number of children 10574
Mean 0.58 0.66 0.64
Standard deviation (0.88) (0.96) (0.94)
State categories 17
Observations 2824 7995 10819
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Table 3: Results of the Linear Probability Model (full sample)
Dependent variable: sector of employment = public sector
(1) (2) (3)
Altruism 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Laziness 0.005 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Altruism  Laziness 0.001
(0.005)
Risk aversion 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.009) (0.009)
Age 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Education: High School (HS) 0.006 0.006
(0.013) (0.013)
Education: More than HS 0.242*** 0.241***
(0.015) (0.015)
Nationality (=German) 0.092*** 0.092***
(0.014) (0.014)
Married 0.007 0.007
(0.014) (0.014)
Widowed -0.013 -0.013
(0.036) (0.036)
Divorced -0.010 -0.010
(0.019) (0.019)
Separated 0.022 0.022
(0.032) (0.032)
Number of children -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 7995 7792 7792
Observations Dep=1 2824 2782 2782
Total Observations 10819 10574 10574
R2 0.002 0.095 0.095
Log Likelihood -6439.136 -5805.423 -5805.412
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Variables
altruism and laziness in column (3) are centred around their sample median.
*,**,*** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at respectively 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level.
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Table 4: Results of the Linear Probability Model with the sample split on
education level
Dependent variable: sector of employment = public sector
Level of education
Less than HS High School (HS) More than HS
Altruism 0.009 0.021** 0.039**
(0.017) (0.009) (0.017)
Laziness 0.005 0.005 0.018***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Risk aversion -0.002 0.002 0.018***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Female 0.126*** 0.106*** 0.132***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.019)
Age 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.016**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education: High School (HS)
Education: More than HS
Nationality (=German) 0.052** 0.093*** 0.123***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.045)
Married -0.064 -0.005 0.056*
(0.042) (0.016) (0.029)
Widowed 0.002 -0.053 0.099
(0.105) (0.042) (0.088)
Divorced -0.103** -0.011 0.022
(0.052) (0.023) (0.044)
Separated -0.058 0.041 0.018
(0.094) (0.040) (0.063)
Number of children -0.005 -0.007 -0.043***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.010)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 962 5184 1646
Observations Dep=1 188 1309 1285
Total Observations 1150 6493 2931
R2 0.050 0.037 0.055
Log Likelihood -458.109 -3161.907 -2022.121
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at respectively 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level.
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Table 5: Results of the Linear Probability Model with the sample split on
industry
Dependent variable: sector of employment = public sector
Industry type
Caring Industries Non-Caring Industries
Altruism 0.040** 0.003
(0.016) (0.008)
Laziness 0.008 0.009***
(0.006) (0.003)
Risk aversion 0.014*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.002)
Female 0.071*** 0.046***
(0.020) (0.010)
Age 0.023*** 0.006**
(0.006) (0.003)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Education: High School (HS) -0.005 0.021*
(0.035) (0.012)
Education: More than HS 0.127*** 0.221***
(0.036) (0.017)
Nationality (=German) 0.112*** 0.078***
(0.041) (0.013)
Married -0.003 0.018
(0.030) (0.014)
Widowed 0.001 0.002
(0.075) (0.037)
Divorced -0.020 0.004
(0.041) (0.020)
Separated 0.011 0.039
(0.063) (0.036)
Number of children -0.031*** -0.012**
(0.010) (0.005)
Intercept Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 1628 5883
Observations Dep=1 1494 1238
Total Observations 3122 7121
R2 0.046 0.073
Log Likelihood -2190.118 -2924.288
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at respectively
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level.
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Table 6: Results of the Linear Probability Model including the interaction
of altruism and laziness with total work experience
Dependent variable: sector of employment = public sector
(1) (2)
Altruism 0.027** 0.038***
(0.012) (0.014)
Laziness 0.002 0.006
(0.005) (0.006)
Work experience 0.001 0.009
(0.002) (0.006)
Altruism  work experience -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Laziness  work experience 0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Work experience2/100 -0.023
(0.016)
Altruism  work experience2/100 0.006
(0.005)
Laziness  work experience2/100 0.002
(0.002)
Intercept Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
State dummies Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 7786 7786
Observations Dep=1 2781 2781
Total Observations 10567 10567
R2 0.095 0.095
Log Likelihood -5798.657 -5797.585
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses.
*,**,*** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at respectively
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level. The variable work experience is measured
in years and rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 7: Results of the Linear Probability Model (rst job sample)
Dependent variable: rst sector of employment = public sector
(1) (2) (3)
Altruism 0.029 0.035 0.035
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
Laziness 0.010 0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Altruism  Laziness 0.003
(0.016)
Risk aversion 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009)
Female 0.007 0.006
(0.037) (0.037)
Age 0.018 0.018
(0.024) (0.024)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Education: High School (HS) -0.053 -0.052
(0.048) (0.048)
Education: More than HS 0.178* 0.178*
(0.092) (0.092)
Nationality (=German) 0.091 0.091
(0.062) (0.062)
Married 0.016 0.016
(0.093) (0.093)
Widowed
Divorced 0.481** 0.481**
(0.241) (0.240)
Separated 0.113 0.112
(0.314) (0.315)
Number of children -0.032 -0.032
(0.022) (0.022)
Intercept Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes
State dummies No Yes Yes
Observations Dep=0 589 450 450
Observations Dep=1 153 120 120
Total Observations 742 570 570
R2 0.004 0.107 0.107
Log Likelihood -379.970 -265.228 -265.211
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors between parentheses. Variables
altruism and laziness in column (3) are centred around their sample median.
*,**,*** indicate signicance based on a two-sided test at respectively 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level. 28
Figures
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector (if  > p)
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of working in the public sector (if  < p)
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Figure 3: Marginal e¤ect of altruism given the years of work experience
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Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in altruism
on the likelihood of working in the public sector for a given number of years of
work experience. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. Years of work
experience are rounded to the nearest integer.
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Figure 4: Marginal e¤ect of laziness given the years of work experience
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Notes: Solid black line shows the estimated e¤ect of a unit increase in laziness
on the likelihood of working in the public sector for a given number of years of
work experience. Dashed lines show the 90% condence interval. Years of work
experience are rounded to the nearest integer.
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